

Message Text

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COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA JAPAN
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA
COMSEVENTHFLT YOKOSUKA JAPAN
CDRUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JAPAN

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DOD FOR ISA

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MARR, JA
SUBJECT: JDA MINISTER SAKATA INTERVIEW CONCERNING US-JAPAN SECURITY
CONSULTATIONS

FOLLOWING TEXT OF INTERVIEW WITH JDA MINISTER

SAKATA PUBLISHED IN AUGUST 8, 1975 EDITION OF ASAHI JOURNAL BROUGHT
TO ATTENTION DATT BY JDA STAFF, WHO CONSIDER IT TO BE GOOD SUMMARY OF
SAKATA'S THINKING ON US-JAPAN DEFENSE CONSULTATIONS.
WE SUBMIT IT AS POSSIBLY TIMELY MATERIAL FOR ADDEES'
PREPARATION FOR FORTHCOMING SCHESINGER-SAKATA TALKS.

BEGIN TEXT QTE EMERGENCY US-JAPAN CONSULTATION IS A NECESSITY--
INTERVIEW WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL DEFENSE AGENCY MICHITA SAKTA:
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Q. REGARDING THE US-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION WHICH THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL ADVOCATES, FIRST THE CONTENT IS A PROBLEM
BUT AT THE SAME TIME, JUST WHEN THE KOREAN SITUATION IS BEING
DEBATED PRIOR TO MIKI'S VISIT TO THE US, THE TIMING AS TO

WHY THIS CAME OUT NOW IS DRAWING ATTENTION.

A. IN ADDITION TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY, BOTH JAPAN AND THE U.S. HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO EXECUTE THEIR RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE TREATY. WITHIN THE EXISTING TREATY, THE JAPAN-US CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE HAS THE DUTY OF CONSULTING AT ALL TIMES UNDER ARTICLE 4 AND DISCUSSES THINGS SUCH AS BASE PROBLEMS. FURTHER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 6 ON BASE UTILIZATION, THERE IS THE JAPAN-US JOINT COMMITTEE FOR THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF OPERATIONS WHICH OCCUR UNDER MUTUAL DEFENSE CONDITIONS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 5, THERE IS NO FORMAL FORUM FOR DISCUSSION.

NOW, IN THIS REGARD, THERE IS A MEETING OF UNIFORMED COUNTERPARTS CALLED THE JAPAN-US STAFF RESEARCH MEETING HEADED BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF USFJ AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF, BUT THIS ONLY DISCUSSES FUNCTIONAL OPERATIONS SUCH AS FACILITIES AND AREAS (BASES) AND EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE. I LEARNED OF IT FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER BECOMING MINISTER BUT THOUGH IT MAY SEEM STRANGE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CIVILIAN CONTROL, IT IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE JAPANESE AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS. ESSENTIALLY, IN THE FORTHCOMING TALK BETWEEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER AND ME, I WILL SAY WE SHOULD DO IT THIS WAY SINCE IT HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE. SHOULDN'T SUCH THINGS BE AUTHORIZED BY BOTH COUNTRIES UNDER THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AND SHARING I HAVE MENTIONED? RATHER THAN A NEW BINDING AGREEMENT OUTSIDE THE SECURITY TREATY ISN'T IT BETTER TO USE THE CAPABILITY OF THE TREATY FRAMEWORK.

NECESSARY DISCUSSIONS BY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES: AGAIN ON 8 MARCH THERE WAS THE QUESTION FROM MR. TETSU UEDA OF THE JSP "ISN'T THERE A SECRET AGREEMENT DIVIDING SEA AREA RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE US?" AND ALTHOUGH, I REPLIED ON 2 APRIL THAT THERE IS NO SECRET AGREEMENT ON ALLOCATION OF SEA AREA RESPONSIBILITIES, THERE IS A NECESSITY TO HAVE SOME AGREEMENT FOR JAPAN-US OPERATIONAL COOPERATION AND I DECLARED FOR THE FIRST UNCLASSIFIED

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TIME THAT I WISHED TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AT A MEETING WITH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER. SINCE THEN, THE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION HAS BEEN DETERMINED. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HAS BEEN COMPLICATED BY THE FALL OF SAIGON ON 30 APRIL AND BLOODY TALKS OF THE EFFECTS ON THE ROK AND NORTH KOREA AND SUCH TALKS CONTINUED IN THE DIET ALSO. THAT IS TO SAY, BECAUSE JAPAN IS AN ECONOMIC POWER AND IS BOUND FIRMLY TO OTHER COUNTRIES, I BELIEVE THE TIME IS OVERDUE TO DISCUSS ASSISTANCE WITH THE U.S. AGAIN. DISCUSSIONS BY RESPONGW DX SN5 9, \$3*3, 3 049?3. (AT ANY TIME) IS A NECESSITY.

Q. THEREFORE, (AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSE SHARING) ISN'T IT TIME FOR JAPAN, WHICH HAS BECOME AN ECONOMIC POWER, TO DEBATE CONCRETELY WITH THE U.S. WHICH HAS

ENDED THE VIETNAM WAR AND BECOME UNENTANGLED ABOUT NOT WHAT IS EXPECTED OF JAPAN BUT WHAT IT CAN DO?

A. YES, IN ADDITION TO CONJECTURING THAT THE U.S. EXPECTS THIS OF JAPAN, WHAT CAN JAPAN DO UNDER CURRENT RESTRICTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND A NON-NUCLEAR POLICY; IF WE DON'T DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM FRANKLY WE WILL NOT KNOW WHAT THE U.S. REALLY EXPECTS OF JAPAN. WE ONLY KNOW THE CONCEPT FRM THE U.S. DEFENSE WHITE PAPER PUBLISHED ANNUALLY AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S REPORT (SIC).

I BELIEVE THAT TALKS WHICH CAUSE GREAT EXPECTATIONS ON THE OTHER SIDE BUT ARE NOT FOLLOWED BY ACTIONS DESTORY A RELIABLE RELATIONSHIP. RATHER WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE CLEARLY WHAT JAPAN CANNOT DO AND DEMONSTRATE BY ACTIONS WHATEVER SMALL THINGS WE CAN DO. EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE RESTRICTIONS, THE EXECUTION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY, CARRIED OUT IN SOME FORM FOR THE JAPANESE PEOPLE'S EXISTENCE AND FREEDOM IS THE ROAD TO HEIGHTEN CREDIBILITY. TO SPEAK OF DEFENSE COOPERATION IS SJMLY DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS.

Q. RECENTLY, SECRETARY SCHLESINGER WAS QUOTED AS COMPLIANING "WHY CANNOT JAPAN PROVIDE MORE THAN 1 PERCENT OF ITS GNP FOR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES?"

A. ACTUALLY, THAT WAS SAID IN CONTRAST TO EUROPE SPENDING ABOUT 3 PERCENT AND SO FORTH. THE 3 PERCENT FIGURE IS A LITTLE UNCLASSIFIED

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ODD BUT IT SEEMS THAT HE HAS THE FEELING THAT JAPAN ALSO COULD STRIVE A LITTLE MORE. IN REALITY, MY MOST RECENT IMPRESSION IS THAT THIS IA CHANGED VIEW FROM THE DARE-DEVIL ATTITUDE WHICH PRESSED US WITH THE CRITICISM OF A "FREE RIDE" IN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. AS A CONSEQUENCE, I BELIEVE THIS IS THE GREATEST DIFFERENCE IN (POST-VIETNAM) JAPAN-US RELATIONS. I THINK THAT EVEN WITHIN THE SAME FREE WORLD CAMP, IS IT NOT ALRIGHT TO HAVE A DIFFERENT APPROACH FROM AMERICA ON JAPAN'S FUTURE ROLE?

THREE DEFENSE PRINCIPLES: FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA, JAPAN HAS A "PIPELINE" TO THE NORTH. THE SAME IS TRUE ALSO WITH REGARD TO HANOI. ALSO IN ASEAN COUNTRIES, IS IT NOT BETTER FOR JAPAN TO WORK WITH OTHER ASIANS RATHER THAN HAVE THE AMERICANS COME OUT DIRCTLY? ACCORDINGLY,, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS BETTER, WHEN WE CONSIDER NORTHEAST ASIA, THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE JAPAN ARCHIPELAGO, THAT AMERICA SHOULD MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR JAPAN'S ROLE AND AUTONOMOUS JUDGEMENT.

Q. THAT IS THE CONTENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL DEFENSE SHARING BUT IT IS SAID THAT, IN AN EMERGENCY, TE CONFORMITY OF JAPAN-US OPERATIONS COOPERATION IS A NECESSITY, HOWEVER, EVERYONE IMAGINES NOW WHEN YOU SAY EMERGENCY THAT, PROBABILITY NOTWITHSTANDING,

YOU MEAN AN EMERGENCY CONDITION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA.
HOWEVER, IN SUCH A SITUATION, WHAT JAPAN CAN DO IS THE PROBLEM
OF ARTICLE 6 CONCERNING THE MODE OF USE OF THE US BASES IN
JAPAN, OR IN OTHER WORDS, THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES AND
REAR SUPPORT WITH PRIOR CONSULTATION BECOMES THE FOCUS.

A. THAT IS CORRECT.

Q. HOWEVER, IN REALITY, THE NECESSITY FOR CONFORMITY OF
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OPERATIONAL COOPERATION RATHER WOULD BE ARTICLE 5 IN WHICH
EITHER THE JAPAN OR THE U.S. POSTULATES A POSSIBILITY THAT
AN ARMED ATTACK WILL OCCUR AND CONSIDERS HOW TO EFFECTIVELY
COUNTER IT. ASIDE FROM THE PROBABILITY, THE POSSIBILITY AND
SETTING CANNOT BE LIMITED TO ONLY THE KOREAN PENINSULA. VIEWED
FROM THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN MILITARY CONCEPT, IT IS (ORDINARILY)
CONSIDERED THAT IT WILL MATERIALIZE AS SOVIET MILITARY AND
NAVAL POWER DEMONSTRATED IN THE FAR EAST. IF THAT IS CORRECT,
ALTHOUGH THE WORLD WATCHES NOW FOR CRISIS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA,
SHOULD NOT THE DISCUSSION BE WHAT MEASURES THE U.S. ACTUALLY
WILL TAKE AGAINST SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS AND WHAT
JAPAN CAN DO IN THIS SITUATION?

AT THIS POINT, BECAUSE OUR COUNTRY HAS NOT ESTABLISHED
A POLICY TO REGARD ANY SPECIFIC COUNTRY WITH HOSTILITY, THE
PREPARATIONS FOR SELF DEFENSE ALSO ARE NOT DIRECTED TOWARD A

SPECIFIC COUNTRY. IF WE WERE TO DO SO, WE WOULD NOT KNOW HOW MUCH DEFENSE STRENGTH WAS NECESSARY. AS FOR US, IF YOU SPEAK OF THE NEXT FOUR OR FIVE YEARS WE FACE, WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY
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EXPECTATION OF PREPARING FOR THE SOVIETS IN PARTICULAR. THE AREAS WHERE INSTABILITY EXISTS ARE IN OTHER PLACES.

WHEN CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN, I HAVE THREE PRINCIPLES. FIRST IS THE PEOPLE'S WILL TO RESIST. SECOND IS THE MINIMUM NECESSARY DEFENSE STRENGTH AS LIMITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. THAT IS SO IT WILL NOT THREATEN OTHER COUNTRIES NOR OPPRESS PUBLIC WELFARE. THE THIRD IS HAVE THE U.S. UNDER THE SECURITY TREATY PROTECT JAPAN AGAINST A LARGE SCALE OR NUCLEAR ATTACK. THESE THREE BECOME AS ONE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY IS PROTECTED AND IT IS MY PHILOSOPHY THAT IF ONE IS LACKING THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN CANNOT MATERIALIZE.

WE SHOULD CONSIDER OPERATIONAL COOPERATION:

Q. IN AN EMERGENCY, SETTING ASIDE THE MATTER OF THE CONFORMITY OF JAPAN-US OPERATIONAL COOPERATION, WHAT ARE SOME SPECIFIC EFFORTS?

A. BECAUSE THERE IS A SECURITY TREATY, I PERCEIVE THAT THERE WILL BE NO PRESSING THREAT IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. HOWEVER, IN THAT PERIOD IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT SOMETHING MIGHT OCCUR. WE MUST PREPARE SOUNDLY THE MINIMUM NECESSARY ITEMS. AT THE SAME TIME, AS THIS IS TIED IN WITH THE SECURITY TREATY IF WE DO NOT CONSIDER OPERATIONAL COOPERATION, WHEN THE NEED ARISES AND WE ARE FLUSTERED ALL WILL BE LOST. WE CANNOT JUST LEAVE IT AS A BLANK PIECE OF PAPER WONDERING WHAT TO DO. THERE IS A THEORY "ISN'T IT ALRIGHT TO LEAVE IT AS IT IS BECAUSE NOTHING HAS HAPPENED AS YET" BUT I THINK WE MUST UNDERTAKE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW.

THE CONTEXT, NO MATTER WHAT IS HEARD, STILL MUST BE DISCUSSED WIDELY. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING IT SUCH AN IMPORTANT THING. IN SHORT, IF, BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES, SCHLESINGER AND I, THE FRAMEWORK IS DECIDED, IT IS GOOD FOR THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TO EXCHANGE INTELLIGENCE AT ANYTIME AFTERWARD. IN THAT WAY, THE RESPECTIVE ORGANS OF BOTH COUNTRIES WILL KNOW WHAT THE UNIFORMED PERSONNEL ARE DOING AND THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN LETTING THEM DO IT.

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Q. DOES THIS MEAN THAT IF SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND MINISTER SAKATA REACH A BROAD AGREEMENT ON DEFENSE SHARING

THAT AGENCIES FOR RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION ON OPERATIONAL
COOPERATION (BASED ON THE AGREEMENT) WILL BE ESTABLISHED?

A. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FORM, THAT IS CORRECT. HOWEVER,
WITH REGARD TO NEW DISCUSSION AGENCIES, THERE IS THE
CONSIDERATION OF RAISING THE JAPAN-US STAFF RESEARCH MEETING
TO THE CIVILIAN LEVEL BY REORGANIZING IT OR ALSO THE THOUGHT
OF MAKING AN ENTIRELY NEW ORGAN. IN EITHER CASE, TO SUMMARIZE,
TOUGH, FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARE IMPORTANT.

I BELIEVE THAT THROUGH SUCH DISCUSSIONS ON AN EQUAL BASIS
WE CAN WORK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW ORGAN. UNQTE
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